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Background: The amount of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments within the German health care system has risen steadily
within the last years. OOP payments aim to strengthen patients’ cost awareness and try to restrict the demand on
medical necessary treatments. However, besides the intended decline of non-induced health care services there’s a
risk that people also forgo necessary treatments because the utilization of health care services depends not only on
need-factors but also on the ability to pay for it.
Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the determinants of the total amount of OOP payments, the financial burden
caused by OOP payments and the relinquishment of health care services due to OOP payments.
Data and methods: The empirical analysis is based on cross-sectional data of the German subsample (n = 2851) of
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a representative panel study among private
households with persons above the age of 50 years and covers a wide range of topics, e.g. health behavior, health
status and information about the socio-economic status. The analysis of the independent variables “total amount of
OOP payments”, “financial burden due to OOP payments” and “forgone care” is carried out by the means of descriptive
as well as multivariate regression methods.
Results: Individuals with low income as well as people suffering from chronic illnesses face a higher financial burden
and forgo health care services more frequently at the same time. E.g. the financial burden of people who belong to
the lowest income quintile is about eight times higher compared to individuals who belong to the highest quintile.
The probability of forgone care for this group is about 5.6 percentage points higher [95% CI: 5.2 – 6.0].
Conclusion: Especially for the group of people with chronic illnesses and low-income earners it cannot be ruled out
that they also forgo necessary medical treatments due to the relatively high financial burden they face. Hence, it is
required to facilitate the access to necessary care for these groups.
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Between 2002 and 2012 overall health care expenditures
in Germany have risen from 228.66 billion € to 300.45
billion €. At the same time, the share of private health
care expenditures on total expenditures has risen from
12.1% to 13.5% [1].
The main source of private health care spending within
the German health care system are OOP payments.
For statutory insured individuals, OOP payments occurCorrespondence: patrick.bremer@uni-wh.de
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in any medium, provided the original work is pfor pharmaceuticals, devices, hospitalization and (until
January 2013) physician visits. The extent of out-of-
pocket expenses for privately insured are regulated in
individual insurance contracts, which can contain any
type of deductible.
At the micro level it is intended that OOP payments
should serve as an instrument to control the use of health
care services by reducing the amount of non-necessary or
non-effective care (reduction of moral hazard). Therefore,
OOP payments aim to reduce public health care spending
and to increase the efficiency of medical care by limiting
the demand to medically justified services [2,3].en Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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onstrated that higher copayment-rates indeed lead to
lower levels of medical care use [4]. Generally it was
shown that the price elasticity of the demand for health
care is not constant but increases as the total amount of
out-of-pocket payments rises [5].
However, when analyzing the individual effects of OOP
payments on health care use, the determining factor is
to a lesser extent the total amount of OOP payments
but rather the relation between the amount of OOP
payments and the available financial means within a
certain period of time – i.e. the financial burden caused
by OOP payments.
In this context, OOP payments are known to cause
regressive effects [6-8]. That means that individuals with
comparatively low income face a higher burden of OOP
payments than individuals with higher income.
Previous studies revealed that this burden is not distri-
buted equally among different social subgroups. E.g. in
addition to low income groups [9,10], particularly individ-
uals with low education (e.g. [11,12]) women (e.g. [12,13])
and people in poor health [14] bear a higher proportion of
OOP payments. At the same time especially the factors
“low income” and “chronically ill” are associated with
the relinquishment of necessary health care services
(e.g. [15,16]), which might result in delayed treatments
and adverse health effects [17].
However, the majority of studies which provide evidence
for cost induced underuse of medical treatments stem
from the US or from low income countries. This means
that these findings not necessarily can be translated to
Germany because of fundamental differences regarding
the organization of the health care system.
E.g., to avoid social disadvantages and an excessive
financial burden due to OOP payments in Germany,
there exist statutory regulations whereupon people with
statutory health insurance only have to pay OOP pay-
ments to a certain threshold which is generally 2% and
for individuals with chronic illnesses 1% of the house-
hold’s gross earnings in one year. When this threshold
is reached, patients can apply for an exemption for the
rest of the year at their health insurance company [18].
Nevertheless, there is evidence that people who receive
exemptions from OOP payments have above-average
difficulties in making ends meet before reaching that
ceiling [19]. Most studies from Germany which deal with
the relationship between OOP payments on the one
hand and health care use on the other hand explore the
effects of increased OOP payments on doctor visits
[20,21]. Only Mielck et al. adopt a broader approach of
forgone care by analyzing the association between for-
gone care (because of costs or unavailability) and household
income in five European countries and found that in
Germany especially low income is a significant determinantfor forgone care [22]. However, relatively little is known
about the relationship between the financial burden and
forgone care due to OOP payments.
Therefore, the aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, the
determinants of the total amount of OOP payments and
the financial burden resulting from private health care
expenses will be examined and a subsequent analysis
focuses on determinants associated with forgone care.
Special emphasis is put on factors which influence both
the financial burden and the relinquishment of health
care services.
The study focuses on people aged 50+ with statutory
or private health insurance in Germany. Analyzing the
above posed research question on this age group is of
particular importance because the demand for health care
services and the subsequent amount of OOP payments
within this group is above-average due to age-related
morbidity [23].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section two describes the data set and the empirical
strategy, in section three the regression results are
presented and the final section discusses the results and
draws some conclusions.Methods
Data
The empirical analysis is based on survey data of the first
wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) which was conducted in 2004. SHARE is
a representative panel study among private households
with more than 30,000 individuals above the age of
50 years from nineteen European countries and Israel.
The survey contains detailed information on a variety of
different subjects like health behaviour, health status and
socioeconomic characteristics. The data was obtained by
computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI), supple-
mented by a self-completion “drop-off-questionnaire”. The
sample in our study was restricted to the German subgroup
which comprises a total of 3008 observations. After deleting
respondents with missing values, the sample size reduced
to n = 2851 observations.Variables and empirical strategy
In the following empirical analysis, descriptive as well as
multivariate regression techniques will be applied. First
of all we will compare the mean values of i) the total
amount of OOP payments, ii) the subsequent financial
burden and iii) the prevalence of forgone care across five
income quintiles. Afterwards, the determinants of the
above mentioned variables will be examined using differ-
ent regression techniques.
The total amount of OOP payments refers to the last
twelve months and comprises as sum of expenses for:
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– outpatient care (doctor visits)
– prescribed drugs
– care in nursing homes, care in day care centres and
home care services
– devices
The variable “financial burden” is defined as percentage
of individual OOP expenses on available income in the
past year. Because of their right-skewed distribution we
took the logarithm of the variables “total OOP payments”
and “financial burden” for the regression analysis. The
variable “forgone care” was created as a dichotomous vari-
able from the question “During the last twelve months,
did you forgo any type of (health) care because of the costs
you would have to pay?” This question referred to the
above mentioned types of care.
The main focus in all regression models lies on the
impact of the ability to pay. Hence, variables for the
income quintiles are included in all models. The variable
“income” is calculated as sum of gross individual income
from employment, self-employment, pensions, capital
assets income and of transfer and rent payments. In
order to get the equivalent disposable income for each
individual, the resultant sums were standardized by the
household-size square root [24]. Furthermore, we con-
trol for socio-demographic characteristics, for indicators
of the individual health status and further variables for
which economic theory [25] and previous studies
(e.g. [26]) suggest that they generally affect the demand
for health care services (education and insurance status).
Table 1 provides further information about the variables
included in the empirical analysis.
The variables “total OOP payments” and “financial
burden” belong to the class of limited dependent vari-
ables with a right-skewed distribution, which means they
are continuous over the most part of their distribution
but have a multitude of observations for a specific value.
In this case both variables have values equal to zero in
16.7% of all observations, i.e. these individuals faced no
OOP payments and therefore did not experience any
financial burden in the past year.
When analyzing these dependent variables the type of
distribution has to be taken into account. Therefore,
different econometric approaches exist which basically
differ from each other regarding the assumption to
what extent the binary decision about the utilization of
health care (yes or no) depends on the resulting amount
of OOP payments.
A possible identification strategy is based on the as-
sumption that the binary decision to seek treatment does
not depend on the resulting amount of OOP payments.
This kind of decision making process can be modeled by
estimating a probit-model for the probability that anindividual makes any health care expenses followed by
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression applied only
to the subsample of people with nonzero expenditures to
estimate the coefficients of the positive levels of OOP pay-
ments (two-part model, 2 PM). The constricted application
of OLS only to the subgroup of individuals with positive
expenditures however raises the risk of sample selection
bias and therefore biased estimates [27].
An alternative approach is to estimate a sample-selection
model (SSM). The SSM is based on the assumption that
the binary decision to demand any kind of care and the
choice of how much to spend, is determined by different
but correlated factors [28].
In the present analysis, the SSM was estimated by esti-
mating a probit-model for the probability of positive OOP
payments as first step, using those results to estimate the
inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) and then running an OLS-model
on the positive amounts of OOP payments to correct the
selection bias. For reasons of comparability, the paper
presents the results of both estimation strategies.
To determine the factors associated with forgone care,
we estimated two probit-models. The rationale of model
1 is to get a first insight into the association between for-
gone care and a person’s income. Therefore, in the first
model, we solely controlled for sociodemographic and
income variables but didn’t account for health character-
istics as we assume that an individual’s health condition
might be correlated with its income. In the full model 2
we included all explanatory variables in order to get the
isolated effect of the income quintiles.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 gives an overview about the mean values of total
OOP payments spent last year (column 1), the subse-
quent financial burden (column 2) and the prevalence of
forgone care (column 3).
From column 1 can be seen, that the average amount of
OOP payments spent in the last year is about 215 Euros,
whereat this value rises across the quintiles, implying
that on average, better off individuals spent a higher
amount for health than individuals with lower income.
For example, expenditures from individuals in the high-
est quintile (326.24 €) where more than twice as high
compared to expenditures from persons in the lowest
quintile (156.25 €).
From column 2 the regressive effect of OOP payments
becomes apparent since the percentage share of OOP
payments on income decreases as income increases. E.g.
the financial burden for the lowest quintile is 3.1%
whereas the corresponding values for the fourth and
fifth quintile account for 0.5% and 0.4%. Hence, individ-
uals with the lowest income face a financial burden
which is about 6 times to 8 times as high.
Table 1 Variable description
Variables Description Ø (N = 2851)
Dependent variables
Total OOP payments total amount of OOP payments in Euro 215.15
Financial burden Percentage of OOP payment expenses on available income 0.012




Age: 50-59 Age between 50–59 years = 1; otherwise = 0 0.35
Age: 60-69 Age between 60–69 years = 1; otherwise = 0 0.39
Age: 70-79 Age between 70–79 years = 1; otherwise = 0 0.19
Age ≥ 80 Age ≥ 80 = 1; otherwise = 0 0.07
Men Gender: male = 1; otherwise = 0 0.47
Ability to pay
Income in thousands of Euros 23.7
1. Quintile if income < 13.176 € = 1; otherwise = 0 0.2
2. Quintile if income between 13.177 € - 19.651 € = 1; otherwise = 0 0.2
3. Quintile if income between 19.652 € - 29.423 € =1; otherwise = 0 0.2
4. Quintile if income between 29.424 € - 50.634 € = 1; otherwise = 0 0.2
5. Quintile if income > 50.635 € = 1; otherwise = 0 0.2
Health status
1-2 chronic diseases1 suffering from 1–2 chronic diseases = 1; otherwise = 0 0.52
≥3 chronic diseases suffering from ≥3 chronic diseases = 1; otherwise = 0 0.2
1-2 acute health problems2 suffering from 1–2 acute health problems = 1; otherwise = 0 0.5
≥ 3 acute health problems suffering from ≥ 3 acute health problems =1; otherwise = 0 0.83
Depressive symptoms3 >3 depressive symptoms = 1; ≤ 3 depressive symptoms = 0 0.27
ADL4 ≥1 limitation in activities of daily living (ADL) = 1; otherwise = 0 0.09
SAH < good5 if self-assessed health is fair, bad or very bad = 1; otherwise = 0 0.44
Education and health insurance
Low education6 for ISCED-values between 0–2 = 1; otherwise = 0 0.18
Intermediate education for ISCED-values between 3–4 = 1; otherwise = 0 0.56
SHI for persons with statutory health insurance (SHI) = 1; for privately insured = 0 0.89
1selectable from a list of 14 chronic diseases 2selectable from a list of 12 acute health problems 3selectable from the EURO-D scale which consists of 12 depression
symptoms. A score of greater than three symptoms is regarded as a cut-off point for a clinically significant depression. 4selectable from a list of 6 activities of daily
living (ADL) such as showering or dressing 5self-assessed health (SAH) measured on a scale from 1 = very good to 5 = very bad 6educational levels are measured
by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) by the UNESCO. ISCED values range from 0 = pre-primary education to 6 = second stage of
tertiary education.
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the relinquishment of health care can be noticed from
column 3, where people in the poorest group reported
forgone care approximately five times more often than
the richest group of individuals.
Determinants for the total amount of out-of-pocket
payments
Table 3 presents the estimation results for “total OOP
payments”, whereat column 1 contains the coefficients for
the probability of nonzero expenditures within the lasttwelve months and column 2 (sample-selection model)
and column 3 (two-part model) illustrate the results for
the absolute amount of OOP payments.
Again, it becomes clear that in absolute terms, individ-
uals with lower income spent less on OOP payments than
high-income earners. This fact becomes evident through
negative and significant coefficients for the first three
income quintiles. In both models, this negative relation-
ship is most pronounced for the bottom quintile since
this group paid 35% (SSM) respectively 40% (2 PM) less
on OOP payments compared to the reference group.
Table 2 Out-of-pocket payments, financial burden and







1. Quintile 156.25(10.39) 3.1(0.004) 8.9(0.01)
2. Quintile 215.83(25.63) 1.3(0.002) 6.2(0.01)
3. Quintile 203.67(17.4) 0.9(0.001) 5.8(0.01)
4. Quintile 206.02(17.98) 0.5(0.001) 5.4(0.01)
5. Quintile 326.24(57.34) 0.4(0.001) 1.8(0.01)
Ø 215.15(12.18) 1.2(0.001) 5.6(0.04)
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negative predictor regarding the probability of positive
expenditures amongst the income-variables (column 1).
Moreover, most variables indicating bad health have a
significant and positive impact on total OOP payments
as well as on the probability of positive OOP payments.
The major determinant for both the total amount of
OOP payments as well as the probability for positive
OOP payments is the fact of suffering from multiple
chronic diseases. Individuals with at least three chronic
diseases spent about 67% (SSM) respectively 97% (2 PM)
more on OOP payments compared to their reference
group - people without chronic diseases.
Additionally, the variables “low education” and “inter-
mediate education” as well as the fact of being statutory
insured have proven to be negative determinants for the
total amount of OOP payments.
The likelihood-ratio test between both models has a
p-value of 0.78 which indicates that the correlation
between both error terms is not significantly different
from zero. Therefore, the hypotheses that both parts
are independent from each other cannot be rejected.Determinants for the financial burden due to out-of-pocket
payments
The regressive effect emphasized above also persists in
the multivariate analysis (Table 4). This is illustrated
by significant and positive estimates for all income-
variables and by an increase of the magnitude of all
coefficients (column 2 and 3). Thus, although the average
sum of OOP payments is lower for low-income earners
(Table 3), the resulting burden is the higher, the lower the
income is.
This regressive effect is most distinctive when comparing
quintile 1 and quintile 2, because for the lowest income
group (a 194% higher share of OOP payments on income
compared to the highest income group) the financial
burden is 60 percentage points higher compared to the
second lowest income group (a 134% higher share of
income compared to the highest income group).Between quintile 2 and quintile 3 (33 percentage
points) as well as between quintile 3 and quintile 4 (36
percentage points) that effect declines considerably
(compare column 2).
With the exception of the variable “symptoms”, all
health measures which indicate bad health have positive
signs. Again, being chronically ill and having limitations
in activities of daily living (ADL) show the strongest
association with financial burden.
Suffering from at least three chronic diseases causes a
92% higher financial burden (SSM) compared to people
with no chronic disease. For individuals with up to two
chronic diseases the additional burden accounts for 56%
on average.
The coefficients from the sample-selection model and the
two-part model rarely differ and the hypothesis that both
parts are independent again cannot be rejected (p-value of
likelihood-ratio test = 0.75). The probit-coefficients for a
non-zero financial burden are identical to the probit-
coefficients for non-zero OOP payments in Table 3, which
can be explained by the fact that all individuals in that
sample have an equivalent household income above zero,
so that facing OOP payments automatically leads to a
financial burden above zero.
Determinants for forgone care
Table 5 reports the marginal effects for two different
model specifications with forgone care as binary dependent
variable. As explained above, special emphasis is put on
the relationship between financial burden and forgone
care in this analysis. Hence, the highest attention is paid
on determinants which have proven to have a significant
impact on the financial burden in the previous analysis
(i.e. low income and indicators for bad health).
From model 1 (column 1) can be seen that the probabil-
ity of forgone care is significantly higher for all four quin-
tiles compared to individuals in the top quintile. This
negative relationship between income and forgone care is
most pronounced for the lowest quintile. When adding
further explanatory variables in model 2 (column 2) the
positive impact of quintile 4 looses its significance whereat
especially the β-values of the two bottom quintiles reduce
considerably but remain significant. This suggests that bad
health is associated with low income – a finding which is
of importance with respect to forgone health care. The
probability of forgone care due to OOP payments is
5.6, 3.3 respectively 4.2 percentage points higher for
individuals belonging to the first, second and third
income quintile compared to the highest quintile.
Among the health measures, having depressive symp-
toms and suffering from chronic diseases are the strongest
predictors for forgone health care. All other variables
don’t show a significant impact.
Table 3 Regression results for the total amount of OOP
payments







Age 50-591 −0.10 −0.20* −0.23**
(0.118) (0.102) (0.094)
Age 60-69 0.00 −0.06 −0.06
(0.118) (0.092) (0.087)
Age 70-79 0.06 −0.04 −0.02
(0.130) (0.097) (0.092)
Men2 −0.14** 0.01 −0.03
(0.062) (0.062) (0.048)
1. Quintile3 −0.23** −0.35*** −0.40***
(0.104) (0.112) (0.092)
2. Quintile −0.08 −0.26** −0.28**
(0.104) (0.102) (0.093)
3. Quintile 0.17 −0.28** −0.23**
(0.110) (0.104) (0.093)
4. Quintile 0.01 −0.13 −0.12
(0.102) (0.119) (0.116)
1-2 chronic diseases4 0.61*** 0.37* 0.56***
(0.069) (0.195) (0.060)
≥3 chronic diseases 0.67*** 0.76*** 0.97***
(0.104) (0.216) (0.079)
1-2 acute health problems5 0.13* −0.05 −0.02
(0.065) (0.065) (0.054)
≥3 acute health problems −0.08 −0.15 −0.17
(0.096) (0.072) (0.067)
Depressive Symptoms6 0.17* 0.17** 0.21***
(0.076) (0.068) (0.055)
ADL7 0.08 0.60*** 0.62***
(0.132) (0.090) (0.084)
SAH < good8 0.24** 0.30*** 0.36***
(0.077) (0.081) (0.055)
Low education9 −0.04 −0.25** −0.26***
(0.104) (0.085) (0.080)
Intermediate education 0.02 −0.21*** −0.20***
(0.071) (0.061) (0.058)
SHI10 0.76*** −0.76** −0.51***
(0.084) (0.262) (0.088)
Constant −0.00 5.38*** 4.79***
(0.195) (0.583) (0.164)
N 2851 2851 2498
Pseudo R2 0.132
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 357.93
Prob > chi2 0.000
Table 3 Regression results for the total amount of OOP
payments (Continued)
Wald chi2(18) 505.21
Prob > chi2 0.000
Adj. R2 0.220
F (18, 2832) 38.02
Prob > F 0.000
Reference categories: 1Age > 80 2Women 35. Quintile 4no chronic diseases
5no acute health problems 6no depressive symptoms 7no limitations in
activities of daily living (ADL) 8self-assessed health (SAH) ≥ good 9high
education 10privately insured 11Sample-Selection Model 12Two-Part Model.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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The main focus of this study was to analyse the determi-
nants of the amount spent on OOP payments within the
last twelve months, the resulting financial burden and the
probability of forgone care due to OOP payments from
people above the age of 50 years in Germany. Special
emphasis was put on factors which influence both the
financial burden and forgone care.
The empirical analysis of the determinants associated
with the amount spent on OOP payments presents a
clear picture: people with higher income and people with
health problems spent a higher amount on OOP payments
compared to their reference group.
The positive relationship between income and the
amount of OOP payments is in line with health
economic demand theory whereby “health” is classified
as normal good with positive income elasticity indicating
that the demand for health care rises when income rises
[25]. Furthermore it is not surprising that health problems
lead to a higher demand for health care and therefore
cause higher OOP payments.
Despite the fact that there is a positive relationship
between income and the amount of OOP payments, a
negative association was revealed between income and the
financial burden due to OOP payments. In this context
all of the four income variables have turned out to be
significant determinants for a comparatively high financial
burden.
The positive signs across all income quintiles confirm
the regressive effect of OOP payments which was found
in several previous studies (e.g. [6,29]), i.e. the economic
burden resulting from OOP payments isn’t distributed
equally because lower income groups bear a higher pro-
portion of OOP payments than higher income groups.
Further, it became apparent that except from having acute
health problems, all indicators reflecting bad health are
associated with a higher financial burden on average.
Regarding the determinants of forgone care it can be
summarized that there is a fundamental connection be-
tween financial burden and cost induced relinquishment
Table 4 Regression results for the financial burden due to
OOP payments
Probit SSM11, OLS 2 PM12, OLS
Variables Burden > 0 Total burden Total burden
Age 50-591 −0.10 −0.22** −0.21**
(0.118) (0.097) (0.1)
Age 60-69 0.00 −0.04 −0.05
(0.118) (0.094) (0.092)
Age 70-79 0.06 −0.02 −0.02
(0.130) (0.103) (0.103)
Men2 −0.14** −0.03 −0.05
(0.062) (0.052) (0.052)
1. Quintile3 −0.23** 1.94*** 1.96***
(0.104) (0.100) (0.100)
2. Quintile −0.08 1.34*** 1.39***
(0.104) (0.096) (0.093)
3. Quintile 0.17 1.01*** 1.07***
(0.110) (0.096) (0.091)
4. Quintile 0.01 0.65*** 0.67***
(0.102) (0.121) (0.078)
1-2 chronic diseases4 0.61*** 0.56*** 0.57***
(0.069) (0.065) (0.064)
≥3 chronic diseases 0.67*** 0.92*** 0.93***
(0.104) (0.084) (0.083)
1-2 acute health problems5 0.13* −0.02 −0.01
(0.065) (0.056) (0.057)
≥3 acute health problems −0.08 −0.18** −0.18**
(0.096) (0.071) (0.074)
Depressive Symptoms6 0.17* 0.21*** 0.23***
(0.076) (0.059) (0.059)
ADL7 0.08 0.65*** 0.66***
(0.132) (0.091) (0.095)
SAH < good8 0.24** 0.37*** 0.39***
(0.077) (0.060) (0.057)
Low education9 −0.04 −0.25** −0.26**
(0.104) (0.085) (0.087)
Intermediate education 0.02 −0.21*** −0.23***
(0.071) (0.062) (0.063)
SHI10 0.76*** −0.55*** −0.53***
(0.084) (0.092) (0.093)
Constant −0.00 −6.49*** −6.52***
(0.195) (0.202) (0.168)
N 2851 2851 2498
Pseudo R2 0.130
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 350.64
Prob > chi2 0.000
Table 4 Regression results for the financial burden due to
OOP payments (Continued)
Wald chi2(18) 1488.57
Prob > chi2 0.000
Adj. R2 0.395
F (18, 2832) 86.72
Prob > F 0.000
Reference categories: 1Age > 80 2Women 35. Quintile 4no chronic diseases 5no
acute health problems 6no depressive symptoms 7no limitations in activities of
daily living (ADL) 8self-assessed health (SAH) ≥ good 9high education
10privately insured 11Sample-Selection Model 12Two-Part Model.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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lower income and individuals with depressive symptoms
spent a significant higher part of their income on OOP
payments and forwent healthcare services more fre-
quently at the same time.
Conclusion
It has to be pointed out that forgone health care should
only be alarming when the health status is affected nega-
tively which most likely tends to be the case when people
forgo medically necessary treatments. The relinquishment
on medically appropriate health care services can lead to
delayed treatments and a further decrease of the health
status. Therefore, it can imply higher costs for health care
systems in the end. Evidence for cost induced under-
supply which led to a deteriorated health status was found
in previous studies especially for the elderly (e.g. [30]), the
socially weak (e.g. [31]) and for chronically ill individ-
uals (e.g. [32]).
One limitation of this study is that it was not possible to
distinguish to which extent people forwent appropriate
treatments or unnecessary care, whereat the relinquish-
ment of the latter coincides with the objective of reducing
moral hazard.
Another weakness of the study might be its cross-
sectional design. This is attributed to the fact that the
question concerning forgone care has been posed solely
in wave 1 so far. However, it would be desirable to exploit
panel observations across time. Particularly the evaluation
of the modifications of the statutory regulations regarding
OOP payments through the GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz
(GMG) in 2004 which led to an increase of OOP pay-
ments on the one hand and to an accentuation of the
OOP payments exemption limit on the other hand, could
provide a deeper insight into the causal effect of OOP
payments on the demand for health care services and the
relinquishment of health care services. Nevertheless, the
results of this study are still of great importance for at
least two reasons: First, as mentioned above, OOP pay-
ments have risen slightly within the last ten years which





Age 50-591 −0.022* −0.002
(0.012) (0.013)
Age 60-69 −0.033*** −0.018
(0.012) (0.012)




1. Quintile3 0.077*** 0.056***
(0.022) (0.02)
2. Quintile 0.045** 0.033**
(0.02) (0.018)
3. Quintile 0.049*** 0.042***
(0.02) (0.019)
4. Quintile 0.033** 0.031
(0.02) (0.017)
1-2 chronic diseases4 0.026**
(0.011)
≥3 chronic diseases 0.035**
(0.018)
1-2 acute health problems5 −0.01
(0.09)















Likelihood Ratio Chi2 26.69 102.00
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.078
Reference categories: 1Age > 80 2Women 35. Quintile 4no chronic diseases 5no acute
health problems 6no depressive symptoms 7no limitations in activities of daily living
(ADL) 8self-assessed health (SAH)≥ good 9high education 10privately insured.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/36might result in a higher burden due to OOP payments on
average. Therefor it is reasonable to assume that the issue
of forgone care by chronically ill and low-income individ-
uals rather increased than decreased. Second, there are
several empirical studies which demonstrate that the
prevalence of forgone care did primarily not arise from
the relinquishment of doctor visits [20,21]. Hence, it is un-
likely that the issue of forgone care by chronically ill and
low-income individuals vanished in the course of the abol-
ishment of the consultation fee in 2013.
In general, these results demonstrate the necessity of
further research activities to address the question if the
existing regulations regarding OOP payments within the
German health care system exhibit a barrier to necessary
treatments for certain social groups. Particularly for people
with chronic illnesses and for low-income earners it cannot
be ruled out that they at least partially forgo necessary
treatments due to the comparatively high financial burden
they face. Hence, it seems to be required to facilitate the
access to necessary care for these groups. To achieve this
objective, two actions are conceivable: First, the exemp-
tion limit could be lowered especially for people with low
income and chronic diseases and a second option would
be to facilitate the option of a “prospective exemption” e.g.
by means of a simple income statement.Competing interests
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